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Dutch
Treat:
Netherlands
Judiciary Only Goes Halfway
Towards
Adopting
Delaware
Trilogy in Takeover Context
ABSTRACT

This Note examines Dutch takeover law in light of the
current inter-EU competition to attract entities to individual
Member States. The recent hostile takeover of the Dutch bank,
ABN AMRO, provides an excellent example of the Netherlands'
opportunity to use its judiciary to solidify its reputation as a
competitive, business-friendly jurisdiction.
The Dutch
Enterprise Chamber can aid the Netherlands in becoming the
preeminent EU country-a similar status to Delaware's
Chancery Court in the United States. Although the Enterprise
Chamber attempted to introduce Delaware law in ABN AMRO,
it unfortunately misapplied the law. As a result, the Dutch
Supreme Court had to overrule its decision; however, the
possibility of adopting Delaware takeover law remains. This
Note proposes that the Dutch Enterprise Chamber adopt the
Delaware takeover trilogy-Revlon, Unocal, and Unitrin-in
order to provide certainty to Dutch takeover law and improve its
corporate governance, which, in turn, should aid the
Netherlands in attractingenterprises. Although it is too early to
know, the Netherlands may become a "EuropeanDelaware."
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I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2007, after a long and contentious battle between two
of the world's largest banks, the Royal Bank of Scotland-led
Consortium triumphed over Barclays and acquired the Dutch bank
ABN AMRO in the largest deal in the banking industry to date.1 The
intense takeover battle began in early 2007 when the third largest
bank in the world, UK-based Barclays, publicly announced its intent
to purchase the largest Dutch bank, ABN AMRO. 2 Within a month,
Barclays and ABN AMRO announced a C63.74 billion deal, 3 whereby
Barclays would acquire ABN AMRO from its shareholders in a stockfor-stock transaction. 4 Shortly after, a Consortium led by the Royal
Bank of Scotland (RBS), also a UK bank, entered the arena with an
attractive C72.27 billion combination stock-for-cash and stock-forstock offer--in face value, nearly £10 billion more to ABN AMRO
shareholders than Barclays. 6 The battle for ABN AMRO had begun.

1.

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, HoOVERS, Feb. 19, 2008, available

at http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/overview.xhtml?ID=ffffsfyhhtrchryfxk. The
Consortium was comprised of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis Bank of Belgium, and
Banco Santander of Spain. RBS-led Consortium Offers Reassurances in Bank Battle,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007, available at http://www.iht.comlarticles/2007/05/
14fbusiness/abn.php [hereinafter RBS-led Consortium].
2.
Jill Treanor, Talks on ABN AMRO Merger May Spark Bid for Barclays,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 20, 2007, at 28; ABN AMRO Holding N.V., HOOVERS,
Sept. 8, 2007, available at http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?
ID=91361.
3.
Carrick Mollencamp, Barclays Touts Surety of ABN Takeover Bid, WALL ST.
J., May 24, 2007, at C8.
4.
Frederick Lambert, The ABN AMRO Ruling: Some Commentaries, 3.
Commentary from a United States Lawyer and Law Professor's Perspective on the
Decision of the Chamber of Business Affairs, 4 EUR. COMPANY L. 168, 174 (2007). A
stock-for-stock exchange occurs when the acquiring company [Barclays] trades its stock
for target company [ABN AMRO] stock. Id. As a result, the former target shareholders
no longer hold target stock, but instead hold the combined target/acquirer entity stock.
Id. This is similar to a Delaware statutory merger, where two companies merge by
exchanging former shares in each separate company for the same proportional interest
in shares of the combined entity. Id. Typically, companies that intend to keep the
target company whole offer stock-for-stock exchanges, whereas companies interested in
breaking up the target offer cash-for-stock exchanges. These generalizations are
consistent with the intents of the bidders-Barclays intended to keep ABN AMRO
together and the RBS Consortium intended to spilt up the company. See RBS-led
Consortium, supra note 1.
5.
A stock-for-cash offer is similar to a stock-for-stock exchange, except
instead of trading target stock for combined entity stock, the target shareholders
exchange their target stock for cash. See Patricia A. Vlahakis, Takeover Law and
Practice 2007, in 39TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, CORPORATE
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 807, 842 n.20 (2006). A pure stock-for-

cash offer effectively retires all former target stockholders (who accept the offer) by
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Desiring to thwart the Consortium's hostile bid and to solidify
the deal with Barclays, the ABN AMRO Board allegedly utilized a
crown jewel defense by selling off its North American subsidiary,
LaSalle Bank Corporation. 7 Bank of America contracted to purchase
LaSalle for $21 billion.8 ABN AMRO management explicitly assured
Bank of America that shareholder approval was not required prior to
the sale of LaSalle, confirming Bank of America's independent legal
research. 9 Almost immediately after announcement of the deal,
however,
ABN
AMRO
shareholders
expressed
significant
disapproval. 10
Viewing the sale of LaSalle as a defense by
management to deter RBS and entrench themselves under
management-friendly
terms
with
Barclays, 1 1 ABN
AMRO
shareholders petitioned the Dutch Enterprise Chamber (also known
as the Chamber of Business Affairs) to enjoin the deal pending
12
shareholder approval.
13
Although "hostile takeovers are the exception, not the rule,"'
they are important within the corporate world for a number of
reasons. First, they incentivize many bidders and targets to proceed
on a friendly basis, since the risk that a friendly merger may turn
hostile constantly underlies negotiations. 14 Both parties recognize
the possibility that the bidder "may take its case directly to the

paying them to relinquish their shares in the combined entity. RBS's offer was a
combination, so each ABN AMRO shareholder received a combination of both cash and
new combined RBS-ABN AMRO stock; thus, ABN AMRO control was not relinquished.
6.
Id. Sources reported conflicting total value of the RBS deal ranging from
C69.9 billion, RBS-led Consortium, supra note 1; to C71 billion, The Royal Bank of
Scotland Group PLC, supra note 1; to €72.27, Barclays Touts Surety of ABN Takeover
Bid, supra note 3. Hereinafter, this note assumes the latter was correct, and thus
reports the RBS deal value equal to €72 billion.
7.
See Eric Dash, Bank of America Files Suit Over Deal to Buy LaSalle, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O7/05/05/business/
worldbusiness/05bank.html. A crown jewel defense is "the sale of an asset, which has
the result of making a company less attractive to a tender offeror." 19 AM. JUR. 2D
Corporations § 2230 (2008). A hostile bid is an unsolicited, unwanted bid for a
company. See Meredith M. Brown, Paul S. Bird & William D. Regner, Introduction to
Hostile Takeovers, in CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2007, CORPORATE LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 309, 313-14 (2006).
8.
Complaint
1, Bank of America Corp. v. ABN AMRO Bank N.V., No. 07
Civ. 3578, 2007 WL 1571950 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007).
9.
See id.
10.
ABN AMRO Shareholders Vow to Sue, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 2007,
available at
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/04/27/abn_amro_
shareholders_vow tosue.
11.
Id.
12.
ABN AMRO Holding N.V./Bank of Am. Corp., 451/2007, Gerechtshof [Hofg
[ordinary court of appeal], Amsterdam, 28 april 2007 (Neth.) [hereinafter ABN AMRO
Shareholder Litigation, Enterprise Chamber]; ABN AMRO Shareholders Vow to Sue,
supranote 10.
13.
Brown et al., supra note 7, at 313.
14.
Id. ("Mhe possibility that a bidder will be able to proceed on a hostile basis
undoubtedly underlies many negotiated transactions.").
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target's shareholders if the target's board 'just says no' [upon
considering the unsolicited attempt]."'1 5 Second, many companies
have used hostile takeovers as a tactic to accomplish strategically
important acquisitions. 16 For instance, if a bidder, such as the RBS
Consortium, sees two competitors merging-ABN AMRO and
Barclays-the bidder may feel compelled to make a hostile bid "as a
matter of strategic market positioning."'17 Third, a bidder may feel
forced to use hostile means if the target refuses even to talk with the
bidder. 18 Finally, hostile takeovers are especially relevant in the
context of transnational transactions, such as the battle over ABN
AMRO, because "hostile activity has been more active overseas than
in the U.S." in recent years. 19
ABN AMRO's sale of LaSalle raises an obvious question: Under
what circumstances, if any, does Dutch law require prior shareholder
approval of management's defensive decisions in a takeover context?
Dutch law is not clear. A clear legal principle would greatly reduce
transactions costs, not only for direct parties to the merger battlesuch as ABN AMRO, Barclays, and RBS-but also for third parties,
such as Bank of America. 20 Delaware's takeover law provides a much
clearer framework for analysis than Dutch law. 21 Although the
ultimate outcome of ABN AMRO's defensive strategy (i.e., ABN
AMRO sold LaSalle to Bank of America) is consistent with Delaware
takeover law, the Dutch principles should be clarified.
The
Netherlands should adopt the Delaware takeover trilogy-Revlon,

15.
Id. at 314.
16.
Id. at 313.
17.
Id. Essentially, the bidder adopts a "now or never" attitude. See Vlahakis,
supra note 5, at 824 ("[S]trategic mergers are not immune from, and may actually
attract, third-party attempts to acquire one of the prospective merger partners.").
18.
Brown et al., supra note 7, at 313.
19.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 823, 835. Overall takeover basics and mechanics
are essentially the same between the U.S. and the Netherlands. Id. See generally
HOLLY J. GREGORY & TOBERT T. SIMMELKJAER, II, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES
172-73 (2002) [hereinafter EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY]; Scott

V. Simpson et al., The Future of Takeover Regulation in Europe, in UNDERSTANDING
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2006, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 725-926 (2006).

20.

See Wilco Oostwouder, Can You Trust the Dutch (Company Law System)?, 4

EUR. COMPANY L. 211 (2007).

21.
See generally Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 951 (Del.
1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). The State of
Delaware is the leading state of incorporation and leading source of corporate state law
within the United States. Thomas J. Dougherty, Takeovers: From Bear-Hug to GoShop, ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, Securities Litigation: Planning and
Strategies 327, 338 (2007).
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Unocal, and Unitrin.22 The result will lead to more certainty and, in
turn, more transactions in the market for corporate control, 23 which
fosters a more attractive legal environment that should increase
business to the Netherlands. Given the current EU landscape, the
Netherlands could take the lead over the UK in the inter-European
regulatory competition for businesses.2 4 Through its judiciary, the
Netherlands has the opportunity to become Europe's Delaware.
Part II of this Note discusses ABN AMRO's corollary sale of
LaSalle to Bank of America, including the decisions of both the Dutch
Enterprise Chamber and the Dutch Supreme Court. Next, it presents
current takeover law in both the Netherlands and in Delaware. Part
III analyzes the similarities between the Netherlands and Delaware
in the context of the two Dutch court opinions regarding ABN AMRO,
and then provides an alternative analysis of ABN AMRO's sale of
LaSalle under Delaware law. Finally, Part -V proposes that Dutch
courts should adopt a version of the Delaware takeover law analysis,
specifically the Revlon, Unocal, and Unitrin doctrines. In order for
this proposal to be successful, the Delaware laws must be tailored to
fit the Netherlands' civil law system and stakeholder-centered view of
corporate governance. 25

II.BACKGROUND

After months of battling against Barclays and ABN AMRO's
institutional shareholders, the RBS-led Consortium ultimately
prevailed.2 6 The resulting RBS-ABN AMRO acquisition was the
largest banking deal to date, at C72 billion.2 7 The events leading up
to ABN AMRO's acquisition, however, are not only important in the
context of banking, but also highlight significant aspects of the
market for corporate control, particularly hostile takeovers.

22.
See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173; Unocal, 493 A.2d 946; Unitrin, 651 A.2d 1361;
Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338 (noting that these cases are so well-known that they
are referred to by these short-hand names).
23.
See Bank of Am. Corp./ABN AMRO Holding N.V., Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 13 juli 2007, OK 135 (ann.
MK) (Neth.),
3.1(viii) [hereinafter ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme
Court]; Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 860.
24.
See generally William Bratton, Joseph McCahery & Erik Vermeulen, How
Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A ComparativeAnalysis (Eur. Corporate
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 91, 2008); infra Part IV.
25.
EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 19, at 17273.
26.
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, supra note 1.
27.
Id.
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28
In general, companies may become unified in a variety of ways
and for a number of reasons. 29 One particular method of unification
is merging, which "consists of a combination in which one of the
constituent companies remains in being, absorbing all the other

constituent [companies]. ' ' 30 A merger is a form of takeover. 3 1 The
decision to merge or unify two companies is almost always based on a
business reason 3 2 -most commonly to increase the firm's profit, 3 3 or to

obtain access to new markets, products, or technologies. 34 Since
corporate statutes in both Delaware and the Netherlands grant broad
powers to directors to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, 35 the judiciary's traditional response has been to defer to
the board of directors. 3 6 Judicial review, however, may be sharpened
in certain circumstances including defending against hostile takeover

bids or engaging in a sale of control.3 7

In Delaware, those

circumstances evoke application of either the "Revlon test" or the

"Unocal standard" supplemented by Unitrin.3 8

Currently in the

Netherlands, however, there is no clear test or analysis to apply to
these situations.
This enhanced standard of review is justifiable in light of the
directors' fiduciary duties of good faith, 39 care, 40 and loyalty 41 to both

28.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2165 (2008) (stating that companies may
become unified through four different arrangements: consolidation, merger,
reorganization, and acquisition of assets).
29.
3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1041.30 (2007) (stating that acquirers may wish
to unify a company to increase the firm's value and make profit).
30.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2165 (2008).
31.
See 3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1041.30 (2007). A takeover occurs when one
company (the target) is acquired by another company (the acquirer). Id. A takeover
turns hostile when the target board opposes the bid by the would-be acquirer. Id.
32.
Under Delaware State law, the board of directors has wide discretion to
manage the business and affairs of a corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2008).
33.
3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1041.30 (2007).
34.
Lisa Blumensaadt, Comment, Horizontal and Conglomerate Merger
Conditions: An Interim Regulatory Approach for a Converged Environment, 8
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 291, 294-95 (2000) ("Mergers provide a way to quickly offer the
latest technological advances.").
35.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a); ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation,
Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.4 (citing BW art. 9 (Neth.)).
36.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 836 (describing Delaware's business judgment
rule); Simpson et al,, supra note 19, at 744-48 (describing Dutch business judgment
rule). Under the Delaware business judgment rule, "directors' decisions are presumed
to have been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company." Simpson et al., supra note 19,
at 744-48 (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341
(Del. 1987), and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360-61 (Del. 1993)).
37.
Vlahakis, supranote 5, at 836; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2196 (2008).
38.
Vlahakis, supranote 5, at 836.
39.
Id. The duty of good faith is derived from the business judgment rule. Id.
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the company and its shareholders 42 because of the potential
conflicting incentives between the director-manager's self-interest in
keeping his job-"entrenchment"-and the shareholders' interest in
maximizing their own profits. 43 A heightened standard of review
subjects the directors' decisions to more exacting scrutiny to
determine if the directors breached their duty of loyalty by engaging
44
in "self-dealing" transactions, such as entrenchment.
The most direct way for a director to entrench himself, and thus
breach his fiduciary duties, is by abusing takeover defenses.
Defenses against unsolicited hostile bids are not per se illegal. 4 5 On
the contrary, defenses are specifically permitted, and even required in
some circumstances under the directors' fiduciary duties. 46 For
instance, the directors' fiduciary duties require opposition of a

takeover attempt that management determines, in its best judgment,
is detrimental to the company or its shareholders.4 7 However, the
power to defend is not absolute, and a corporation does not have
"unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat" by any means

available. 48 Hence, to protect against abuses, courts hold directors to
the enhanced scrutiny tests under the Revlon, Unocal, and Unitrin
trilogy for determining when takeover defenses are acceptable and
49
what is the appropriate level of defense.
Given this brief overview of the analytical framework employed
by courts in the takeover context, it is time to turn to the events
leading up to RBS's ultimate acquisition of ABN AMRO. First, the
facts of the ABN AMRO acquisition are expanded, including

40.
Id. at 837. The duty of care "may be characterized as the directors'
obligation to act on an informed basis after due consideration of the relevant materials
and appropriate deliberation." Id.
41.
Id. at 837-38. Traditionally courts have defined the duty of loyalty in
"broad and unyielding terms," declining to establish a bright-line test. Cede, 634 A.2d
at 363-64. In Cede the court "indicated that 'any' interest of a director in the
transaction does not per se establish a breach of the duty of loyalty; rather, the
director's self-interest must involve evidence of disloyalty." Id.
42.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2196 (2008).
43.
See 3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1041.30 (2007); Vlahakis, supra note 5, at
837; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(explaining that directors are often confronted with an inherent conflict of interest
during contests for corporate control "[blecause of the omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders").
44.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 837-38.
45.
See 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2224 (2008); Simpson et al., supra note
19, at 868-70.
46.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2224 (2008).
47.
Id.
48.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
49.
Cf. Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: The Impact
of QVC and its Progeny, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 945, 983 (1995) (stating that while Revlon,
Unitrin, and Unocal each nominally apply an enhanced scrutiny standard, application
of enhanced scrutiny in pre-sale and post-sale contexts differ).
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summaries of both the Dutch Enterprise Chamber decision in favor of
ABN AMRO's shareholders and the Dutch Supreme Court's reversal
in favor of the ABN AMRO board. The following two subsections
elaborate upon Dutch and Delaware takeover laws, as both the Dutch
Enterprise Court and the Delaware Chancery Court specialize in the
business law of their respective jurisdiction. 50
A. RBS-led Consortium'sAcquisition of ABNAMRO
ABN AMRO is a large banking group headquartered in the
Netherlands. 51 The group's activities include retail banking in the
Netherlands, the United States, Brazil, and Italy.52 ABN AMRO
entered the United States market in 1979 by acquiring LaSalle Bank
Corporation.5 3
ABN AMRO has approximately one hundred
54
thousand employees worldwide.
ABN AMRO's board of directors, in keeping with its fiduciary
duties, frequently assessed the strategy and position of the
company. 55 According to Professor Cornelis de Groot of Leiden
University in the Netherlands, prior to any merger considerations,
the ABN AMRO Board assessed four general options for the future
growth and increased profits of the company: (1) going further alone
(the "stand alone" scenario); (2) growth by acquiring smaller
competitors; (3) entering into a merger with a bank of the same size
or somewhat larger size; or (4) splitting up the company. 56 Initially,
the Board did not seriously consider this last option "because selling
some valuable parts, like LaSalle, might appear to be profitable but
would leave the remainder of ABN AMRO too small to be spit [sic] up
further profitably. '57 Instead, management adopted a combination of
options two and three, gradually preferring option three. 58 Thus, by
early 2007, the board had determined that "the most viable option for

50.
Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338 (stating that in the United States,
Delaware "remains the leading state of incorporation and leading source of corporate
state law"); Lambert, supra note 4, at 176 (describing the Dutch Enterprise Chamber
as having unique jurisdiction, specialized power of inquiry, and specialized business
expertise).
51.
Cornelis de Groot, The ABNAMRO Ruling: Some Commentaries, 1. Outline
of The Case, 4 EUR. COMPANY L. 168, 168 (2007).
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
ABN AMRO Holding N.V., supra note 2.
55.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 168.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. It is interesting to note that ABN AMRO management's ultimate shift
of endorsements from Barclays to the RBS-Consortium illustrates yet another shift in
Board strategy (i.e., to the fourth option). Id. This presents no shareholder rights
problem, however, because the RBS deal maximized shareholder profits.
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ABN AMRO [was] to enter into a merger." 59 Consequently, ABN
AMRO entered into preliminary friendly talks with Barclays, an
60
established British bank.
By the end of February, one of ABN AMRO's institutional

shareholders, the Children's Investment Fund Management,
attempted to maximize its profit by pressuring the board to end talks
with Barclays and split up the corporation, dividing the proceeds
among the shareholders. 61 Around the same time, the Bank of
62
America Corporation expressed an interest in acquiring LaSalle.
Nonetheless, on March 20, 2007, ABN AMRO and Barclays
announced a proposed merger.63 On April 12, 2007, the three
Consortium banks-Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Banco
Santander-notified ABN AMRO of its intent to make a public
takeover bid for LaSalle.6 4 Shortly after this notification, another
institutional shareholder, the Vereniging van Effectenbezitters
(VEB), 65 sent the ABN AMRO board a letter expressing displeasure
with the exclusive nature of the talks with Barclays, and suggested
that ABN AMRO explore the RBS Consortium offer before
committing to Barclays. 66 In addition, the VEB questioned the
change in corporate strategy from stand-alone target to actively
67
courting Barclays.
In response, ABN AMRO appeared willing to talk with the
Consortium following the exclusionary period that ended on April 20,
2007.68 ABN AMRO, however, contracted to sell off its U.S. division,
LaSalle, to Bank of America prior to expiration of this exclusionary
period.6 9 Although the board asserts that it acted in fairness and

59.
Id.
60.
Cf. ABN AMRO Holding, N.V., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
Under Section 14(d)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14D-9/A), at 4
(Sept. 16, 2007) (stating that the board of directors made a decision to intensify
friendly talks with potential merger partners in the first quarter of 2007, and that it
soon became apparent that a merger with Barclays would meet strategic goals).
61.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 168.
62.
Id.

63.

ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

3.1 (viii).
64.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 168.
65.
Id. Translated from Dutch to English, "Vereniging van Effectenbezitters"
means "Dutch Investors' Association." Id. The VEB is a shareholder's organization in
the Netherlands that plays an active role advocating shareholders' rights. VEB - Dutch
Investors' Association, http://www.veb.net/overveb/code.php?codenr=91 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008).
66.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 168.

67.

ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

3.1(vii), (xi); de Groot, supra note 51, at 168.

68.

ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

3.1(viii), (xi) (stating that ABN AMRO and Barclays preliminary negotiations
included a thirty-day exclusivity period).
69.
Id. 3.1(x), (xi), (xv).
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good faith, 70 some shareholders, including VEB, believe this was an
attempt to thwart the RBS Consortium from making a bid, favoring
the Barclays deal as better for management. 71 Nonetheless, ABN
AMRO management denied these allegations: "[T]he agreement with
Bank of America was not the result of any request on the part of
'72
Barclays.
Most likely, the sale of LaSalle to Bank of America was a crown
jewel defense against the RBS-led Consortium's anticipated hostile
74
bid.7 3 ABN AMRO knew the Consortium would desire LaSalle.
Consequently, ABN AMRO hoped to deter RBS's bid by denuding it of
a key business or asset. 75 It also prevented a bidding war over
LaSalle that could have detracted from ABN AMRO's larger goal of
merger. 76 Regardless of whether Dutch law required prior approval
by the ABN AMRO shareholders, management did not have enough
time to present the sale to a vote due to such short notice. 77 In order
to significantly hinder the RBS Consortium, the ABN AMRO Board
78
had no choice but to act in the manner it did.
Notwithstanding the strong inference of %ad faith," or an
entrenchment motive, from the alleged facts, the ABN AMRO Board
did switch its endorsement from Barclays to the Consortium, albeit
after Bank of America contracted to purchase LaSalle. This action

70.
See id. I 3.1(xxiv), (xxvii).
71.
Id.
3.1(xi); de Groot, supra note 51, at 169. The facts point to a crown
jewel defense: ABN AMRO received notice from the RBS Consortium prior to selling
LaSalle to Bank of America. ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court,
supra note 23,
3.1(xi); de Groot, supra note 51, at 169. In the Netherlands, a bidder
must give a company seven days notice before making an official bid. Simpson et al.,
supra note 19, at 860 ("Bidder must notify target prior to making a hostile bid."). Hence
the Board was presented with a perfect opportunity-the sale of LaSalle-to thwart an
unwanted bidder. Even after receiving an official bid, the Board arguably could have
sold LaSalle and avoided talks with the Consortium by relying on the 30-day
exclusivity period in its agreement with Barclays. ABN AMRO ShareholderLitigation,
Supreme Court, supra note 23, 3.1(viii).
72.
de Groot, supranote 51, at 169.
73.
See Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 211; ABN AMRO Shareholders Vow to
Sue, supranote 10; Dash, supra note 7 (defining the crown jewel defense).
74.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 170. This proved to be true on May 14, 2007
when 'RBS confirmed ...its desire to take over LaSalle." RBS-led Consortium, supra
note 1. Additionally, Fortis of Belgium announced its desire of ABN AMRO's Dutch
operations and Santander of Spain announced its desire of the bank's Brazilian and
Italian arms. Id.
75.
See RBS-led Consortium, supra note 1; CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
MERGERS AND DIVESTITURES § 10:89 (West 2008).
76.
de Groot, supranote 51, at 168, 170.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
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lends some credibility to an assertion of fairness and good faith on the
79
part of the board.
The board initially appeared uninterested in the RBS
Consortium.80 Failure to present the sale of LaSalle for prior
approval by the shareholders led to outrage, specifically due to the
lack of board transparency in this hostile bid context. 81 In response,
on April 27, 2007, the VEB sued the Board and asked the Enterprise
Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for an injunction of the
LaSalle sale until it was put to a shareholder vote.8 2 The Enterprise
Chamber acquiesced and ordered an injunction and shareholder vote,
reasoning that the sale of LaSalle functioned similarly to a "poison
pill" for the larger proposed Barclays-ABN AMRO deal, and, thus,
should have been put to the shareholders first. 83 ABN AMRO,
Barclays, and the RBS-led Consortium appealed the judgment to the
Dutch Supreme Court. 84 On July 13, 2007, the Supreme Court
overturned the Enterprise Chamber's decision, allowing the sale of
LaSalle to Bank of America to proceed without shareholder
approval.8 5 Ultimately, the RBS Consortium won the bidding war
and acquired ABN AMRO (without LaSalle) in October 2007.86
1.

The Dutch Enterprise Chamber Decision: An Attempt to
Introduce Delaware Trilogy

The VEB's April 27, 2007 application on behalf of itself and other
shareholders before the Dutch Enterprise Chamber was filed under
the provisions on the "right of inquiry" in Book 2 of the Dutch Civil
Code. 87 VEB requested that the court find "well-founded reasons to
doubt good policy on the part of ABN AMRO" with regard to the sale

79.
See ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,
3.1(xxiv), (xxvii); Julia Kollewe, ABNAMRO Drops its Support for Barclays Takeover
Terms, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 31, 2007, at 20.
80.
ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,
3.1(xxvii).
81.
ABNAMRO Shareholders Vow to Sue, supra note 10.
82.
ABNAMRO Shareholder Litigation,Enterprise Chamber, supra note 12.
83.
Id. A poison pill is a takeover defense which "enables the [target's] board of
directors to prevent the acquisition of a majority of the company's stock through an
inadequate or coercive tender offer, while giving the board leverage to negotiate with
potential acquirers." 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2186 (2008). Dutch law leaves
"decision making on [the ownership of] shares" to the shareholders, thus arguably
allowing shareholders a cote on takeover defenses in certain circumstances. See de
Groot, supra note 51, at 170 (citing Stork, JOR 2007, 42, Chamber of Business Affairs
17 January 2007).
84.
ABNAMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23.
85.
Id. 5.
86.
Phillip Inman, No Regrets, Says Barclays Boss over Failed ABN Bid, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 2007, at 42.
87.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 169.
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of LaSalle to Bank of America. 88 Essentially, the complaint stated
the VEB's view that ABN AMRO could not sell LaSalle without the
prior approval of the general meeting of shareholders. 89 The VEB
asserted that the agreement to sell LaSalle to Bank of America was
made in bad faith "because it prevented the shareholders of ABN
AMRO from seriously deciding between a public takeover bid by
Barclays and a better bid by the Consortium of banks or any other
party."90 In other words, the VEB alleged that the board's decision to
sell LaSalle to Bank of America constituted a crown jewel defense. 91
The Enterprise Chamber decided in favor of the shareholders
and prohibited the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement for
LaSalle between ABN AMRO and Bank of America prior to approval
of the general meeting of shareholders. 92 The Court's conclusion that
prior approval was needed for this asset sale is based on the Court's
earlier decision in Stork:
[D]iscussions on the strategy of a corporation must be held within the
framework of company law in the Netherlands as well as prevailing
views on corporate governance, that boil down to the fact that strategy
setting is in principle a function of the management board... and that
the general meeting of shareholders can forward its opinion by
exercising rights given to it by statutory law and by the articles of
93

incorporation.

The Enterprise Chamber distinguished between merely selling
an asset and selling the shares of the corporation that owns the
asset. 94 In the first situation, management has sole discretion to sell
an asset, such as LaSalle. 95 However, "decision making on (the
ownership of) shares and the rights attached to them is the exclusive
right of the shareholder" prior to consummation, but not before the
choice to defend. 96 Since ABN AMRO management connected the sale
of LaSalle to the Barclays bid by conditioning the Barclays-ABN
AMRO deal on the sale of LaSalle to Bank of America,9 7 the sale of
the asset to Bank of America was not analyzed in a vacuum. Instead,
it was examined in the larger context of selling the shares of ABN

88.
Id. The Netherlands' concept of "good policy" is analogous to the United
States' concept of "good faith." Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 169-70.
91.
See 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2176 (2008) (defining the crown jewel
defense); see also supra text accompanying note 7 (for definition of crown jewel
defense).
92.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 211.
93.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 170 (citing Stork, JOR 2007, 42, Chamber of
Business Affairs 17 January 2007).
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. (citing ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Enterprise Chamber, supra
note 12).
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AMRO. 98 Thus, the Enterprise Chamber found the sale of LaSalle to
be linked inextricably to the larger strategy of merging ABN AMRO
with another company. 99 Nonetheless, the court concluded that ABN
AMRO, Barclays, and Bank of America had not "engaged in a
coordinatedeffort to frustrate the Consortium in its efforts. Rather
than that, it may be assumed . . .that this represented a 'good
opportunity' and a windfall, that they themselves connected to the
public takeover bid by Barclays." 10 0
The Enterprise Chamber also concluded that the Board's
decision to change strategies from a "stand alone" approach to a
merger plan meant that "the domain of issues that - within the
framework of statutory law and corporate governance rules - [fell]
within the competence of [management was] abandoned, and that the
decision making about such a public takeover bid ...[fell] within the
competence of the shareholders." 10 1 In addition, the Enterprise
Chamber concluded its opinion with language that once the
corporation was "up for sale" the board's role was to maximize
10 2
shareholder profit.
2.

The Dutch Supreme Court Decision: Apparent Rejection of
Delaware Trilogy

The Dutch Supreme Court's July 13, 2007 ruling rendered a
landmark decision with regard to shareholder rights and corporate
governance in takeovers in the Netherlands, and potentially the
entire European Union. 10 3
The Supreme Court rejected the
Enterprise Chamber's reliance on Dutch case law, and instead relied
solely on Dutch written law and the articles of association of the
company. 10 4 In interpreting the Dutch Civil Code provisions, the
Supreme Court turned to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code for
guidance. 10 5 Principle 11.1 of the Corporate Governance Code relates
to the role and procedure of the management board. 10 6 It states that
the "role of the management board is to manage the company, which
means, among other things, that it is responsible for achieving the

98.
Id.
99.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 212-13.
100.
de Groot, supra note 51, at 170 (emphasis added).
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 170-71. "Up for sale" language most likely refers to Delaware's Time
decision. See Part III.B.
103.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 211.

104.
4.4.

See ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

105.
Id.
106.
TABAKSBLAT CODE [TC] art. I.1 (Neth.), available at http://corpgov.nllpage/
downloads/CODE%20DEF%2OENGELS%20COMPLEET%20III.pdf.
The Tabaksblat
Code is the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.

20081

ADOPTING DELA WARE TRILOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS

1225

company's aims, strategy and policy, and results."10 7
When
discharging this role, the management board "shall be guided by the
interests of the company and its affiliated enterprise, taking into
consideration the interests of the company's stakeholders."10 8
Principle II of the Corporate Governance Code adds substance to
two pertinent sections of the Dutch Civil Code. 10 9 Section 2:8 of the
Code requires managers and others involved with the company to act
with "reasonableness and fairness" toward each other. 110 Section 2:9
states that every managing board member has, in essence, fiduciary
duties to the company.' 1 ' In particular, the requirements of both the
Dutch Civil Code and the Corporate Governance Code do not require
the managing board to ask, or even consult, the general meeting of
shareholders for approval or opinion with regard to a transaction that
falls within the authority of the managing board. 112 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court overruled the Enterprise Chamber's decision to the
contrary, concluding that the ABN AMRO board was not required to
113
consult its shareholders.
Principle IV of the Corporate Governance Code provides
substance for Section 2:107(a) of the Dutch Civil Code. 114 Section
2:107(a) describes which decisions of the managing board
(enumerated in Sections 2:8 and 2:9, supra) are subject to approval of
the general meeting of shareholders. 1 5 During promulgation, the
Dutch Parliament explicated the rule, stating that the general
meeting of the shareholders does have a role to play in decisions that
involve disposal of company assets, but only when "those decisions
are so drastic that they change the nature of the shareholdership in
the sense that the shareholder would, as it were, be providing capital
' 16
to, and taking an interest in, a materially different enterprise."
Principle IV provides that "any decisions of the management board on
a major change in the identity or character of the company or the
enterprise shall be subject to the approval of the general meeting of
shareholders.' 1 1 7 The Supreme Court held that the mere sale of an
asset, such as LaSalle, clearly is not "a significant change in the

107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
See ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

4.4.

110.
111.
112.

See id. (citing BW art. 8 (Neth.)).
Id. (citing BW art. 9 (Neth.)).
Id.

113.

Id. t

114.

See id.

115.

Id. T 4.7.

4.5, 6.

4.8.

116.
Id. (citing Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Records II 2001-2002,
28:179, no. 3, at 18-19 (Neth.)).
117.

TABAKSBLAT CODE [TC] art. IV.1 (Neth.), available at http://corpgov.nl/

page/downloadslCODE%20DEF%20ENGELS%20COMPLEET%2011I.pdf.
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identity or the character of the company."11 8 Thus, the ABN AMRO
Board violated neither the Dutch Civil Code nor the Corporate
Governance Code.
As additional justification, the Supreme Court pointed to the
"legal certainty required in commerce" for refusing to extend the
powers of the shareholders in this context. 119 This is premised on the
legal principle, pacta sunt servanda,120 which is especially important
in international agreements. 12 1 The Enterprise Chamber's decision to
require prior shareholder approval to sell an asset had to be
overruled because it was inconsistent with Civil Code Section 2:107(a)
and because the Dutch legislature declined to adopt a mandatory rule
"precisely for the sake of legal certainty."'122
The Court also
recognized the significant concern that third parties, such as Bank of
America, must be able to rely on the ex ante legal opinions and
research of the Dutch written law performed prior to entering into
the agreement with ABN AMRO. If third parties cannot rely on
written law, then the probability of completing a deal decreases while
the transaction costs associated with the deal increase. 123
B. Dutch Law
1.

Takeover Code & EU Takeover Directive

For over fifteen years, the European Union (EU) has failed in its
attempts to standardize company and takeover law across its Member
States. 124 Finally, in 2004, the EU (of which the Netherlands is a
Member) adopted the Directive on Takeover Bids, which is "aimed at
creating a level playing field among EU companies and removing
barriers to takeovers.' 25 Article 9 of the Directive "prevents boards
from adopting takeover defenses without first obtaining shareholder
approval.' 26 Specifically, "the target board may not take any
'frustrating action' that might cause the offer to fail, other than
seeking alternative bids, without obtaining prior shareholder

118.
ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.7
(quoting BW § 2:1 0 7(a)(1) (Neth.)).
119.
Id. 4.4.
120.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 211. Pacta sunt servanda literally means
"agreements should be performed." Id.
121.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321 cmt. a (1987) ('This
section states the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which lies at the core of the law of
international agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international
law.").
122.
ABNAMRO ShareholderLitigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.8.
123.
See Oostwouder, supra note 20; cf. ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation,
Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.4.
124.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 731.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 731-32.
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approval. ' 127 Although the Takeover Directive appears to create a
uniform code, in reality it is not very strong; the Portuguese
Compromise significantly weakened the Directive by making "the
adoption of rules limiting the use of takeover defen[se mechanisms
optional. ' 128 The Netherlands was one of many Member States to opt
out of Article 9.129
Prior to the EU Directive, the Netherlands did not have a

takeover code. 130 Dutch company law, however, granted considerable
rights to shareholders, such as the right to prior approval of a

merger. 131 However, these rights are subject to limitation by the
company's articles of association, and, unsurprisingly, shareholder
rights are frequently limited. 132 In September 2004, the Dutch began
to modernize its company law. 133 On May 24, 2007, the Netherlands
adopted the EU Takeover Directive, albeit opting out of Article 9, in
Section 2:359(b) of the Dutch Civil Code. 134 The Code specifically
provides that companies may choose to give its shareholders rights of
approval. 135
The legislature chose not to mandate this right of

approval. 136 Thus, the legislature's choice
confirms that the circumstance that a public bid has been issued or is to
be expected on the shares of a listed company, does not necessarily
entail that the managing board and the supervisory board - until the
result of the bid having been honoured has been disclosed or the bid has
lapsed - must only safeguard the interest of the shareholders and have
it prevail, or must refrain from decisions that may influence whether
137
the bid is or is not accepted by the shareholders.

Prior to late 1990s, "hostile takeovers
Netherlands" and the business community

were rare in the
"frowned on such

127.
Id. at 732.
128.
Id.
129.
See id. at 744; ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra
note 23,
4.6. The limited reach of Article 9 is just one example of the emerging
competition among Member States. See generally Bratton et al., supra note 24. As
discussed in Part IV, the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers and the recent European
Court of Justice rulings have significantly increased this competition. Id. at 5.
130.
Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 744.
131.
See Michiel Huizingal & Martha Meinema, The Netherlands, in THE
EUROPEAN COMPANY - ALL OVER EUROPE: A STATE-BY-STATE ACCOUNT OF THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 200, 205 (Krzysztof Oplustil & Christoph
Teichmann eds., 2004) (stating that under Dutch law a general meeting of
shareholders must approve a merger).
132.
See EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 19, at
38-39, 38 tbl.O.
133.
See Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 744. Note that company law is the
European analogue to U.S. corporate law.
134. ABNAMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supranote 23, 4.6.
135.
BW § 2:359(b) (Neth.).
136. ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supranote 23, 4.6.
137. Id.
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conduct."'138 The environment changed, however, in 1999, when
LVMH Moat Hennessy - Louis Vuitton S.A. attempted a hostile
takeover of Gucci Group NV. 139 Beginning with the attempted
takeover of Gucci, "the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court
of Appeals played a key role in determining the outcome of disputes
among acquirers, target companies and other stakeholders and its
decisions have begun to provide a judicial framework for takeovers in
the Netherlands. '140 Nevertheless, the judicial framework can, and
should, be improved.
2.

Dutch Takeover Defenses

The Netherlands does not have a set rule regulating takeover
defenses. 141 Though a civil law jurisdiction, 142 the Netherlands relies
on "essential principles of good business judgment" as interpreted by
Dutch courts. 143 The appropriate Dutch judicial standard of review is
"good business judgment," which is similar to Delaware's business
judgment rule-both standards require reasonableness
and
fairness. 144 In addition, Dutch courts have been relatively open to the
use of takeover defenses if the company "could make a good faith
argument that the takeover threat was against the best interest of
the target and all its constituents. '145 In particular, the Dutch
Supreme Court enumerated factors governing the validity of the
defense: an anti-takeover device should have a temporary nature, be
1 46
proportional, and not be irreversible.
Dutch law permits hostile bids. 147 However, "the bidder is
required to notify the target and to enter into talks with its board
regarding the offer price and the reasons for the bid." 148 Thus, the
element of surprise often accompanying hostile takeovers is lacking
in the Netherlands. Regardless, a threat may exist to the company
and the company may employ takeover defenses if the defense is in
the interest of the company and the measures taken are proportional

138.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 745.
139.
Id. at 745-46.
140.
Id. at 745.
141.
Id. at 746.
142.
EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 19, at 32
tbl.L.
143.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 746.
144.
See id.; Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 836-38.
145.
Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 746-47.
146.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 213 (citing RNA, Hoge Raad der Nederland
[HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 april 2000, NJ 2003 (286, m.n.t. Ma.)
(Neth.)).
147.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 852.
148.
Id.
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to the threat. 149 As a result of the proportionality limitation, crown
jewel defenses are not common in the Netherlands. 150 Additionally,
according to a 2007 Skadden Arps study, crown jewel defenses not
only "appear less popular" but are also "potentially less effective if
151
challenged in the courts" than other more common defenses.
The rationale behind allowing companies to implement takeover
defenses is two-fold. First, the business and financial markets have
historically tolerated takeover defenses. 15 2 Second, Dutch boards not
only owe duties to the company and its shareholders, but also to all of
the company's stakeholders. 15 3 Note, however, that Dutch boards
merely have a duty, and not a fiduciary duty, to the stakeholders; the
154
board's fiduciary duty applies exclusively to the company.
C. Delaware Law
1.

Takeover Law

In the United States, Delaware "remains the leading state of
incorporation and leading source of corporate state law."'1 55 Delaware
law clearly defines directors' duties and provides a clear analytical
framework for examining breaches of those duties in merger
contexts. 156 Directors and officers of the corporation have fiduciary
duties to the company's shareholders. 157 When examining the actions
of a corporation in a takeover setting, Delaware courts use one of
three standards of review: the traditional business judgment rule,
158
enhanced scrutiny, or entire fairness.
The first standard of review-wherein the court is very
deferential to board decisions-is predicated on the Delaware General
Corporation Law section 141(a), which provides that "[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation ...shall be managed by or under the

149.
Id. at 867; cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1986) ("[D]irectors must analyze the nature of the takeover and its effect
on the corporation in order to ensure balance - that the responsive action taken is
reasonable in relation to the threat posed." (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))).
150.
Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 868.
151.
Id. at 870.
152.
Id. at 868.
153.
Id. (including "employees, shareholders, and suppliers").
154.
EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supranote 19, at 172.
155.
Dougherty, supranote 21, at 338.
156.
See generally Vlahakis, supranote 5, § II.
157.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1388 (Del. 1995).
158.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 836.
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direction of a board of directors."'159 This business judgment rule
presumes that directors' decisions are made on 'an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.' 1 60 When this rule applies, decisions
made by the directors are protected unless the 'party challenging the
[board's] decision"' meets its burden 'to establish facts rebutting the
presumption."' 161 To rebut the presumption, the challenging party
must show that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty
or of care. 162 "If the business judgment rule is not rebutted, a 'court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the [board's]
decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose. 1 6 3 This
64
standard is typically very easy to meet.1
The second set of standards are intermediate ones, defined by
common law and named for the cases in which they were
pronounced. 165 The relevant standards for takeover law are Revlon,
Unocal, and Unitrin.16 6 Under Revlon, the directors have a duty to
achieve the highest price reasonably available for the shareholders in
a sale-of-control transaction.16 7 The Revlon standard, as clarified by
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., is triggered
by "a pending sale-of-control transaction, regardless of whether or not
there is to be a break-up of the corporation.' 68 A change of control
occurs "when a majority of a corporation's voting shares are acquired
by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting
together."'16 9 The Delaware courts will examine the board's conduct
under the heightened Revlon standard only in the sale-of-control
1 70
context.

159.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).

160.
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)).
161.
Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812) (alteration in original).
162.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 836-37 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
163.
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (alteration in original).
164.
Cf. Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 838 (explaining that directors' decisions
receive "great deference" (quoting Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 46 n.17 (Del. 1994))).
165.
Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338.
166.
Id.
167.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 840.
168.
QVC, 637 A.2d at 46. "Revlon . . . does not hold that an inevitable
dissolution or 'break-up' is necessary" for heightened scrutiny to apply. Id.
169.
Id. at 42. In QVC, the aggregate public stockholders held the majority of
Paramount's voting stock before the transaction and would only have held a minority
voting position in the surviving corporation if the Paramount-Viacom transaction was
consummated. Id. at 43. Thus, the proposed Paramount-Viacom transaction
constituted a sale of control. Id.
170.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 839.
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The Unocal standard is triggered when directors "unilaterally
adopt defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat."171 The
Unocal test is two-pronged: first, the directors must show that they
had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed"; second, they must show that the
defensive measure chosen was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed."'1 72 The result of satisfying both prongs is the business
judgment rule standard of review. However, if either prong is not
satisfied, then the board's action receives an enhanced level of
173
scrutiny under Unitrin.
The Unitrin analysis adds an additional layer to the Unocal
analysis.
Unitrin "reaffirmed the power of directors to take
reasonable steps to resist hostile bids."'1 74 In applying Unocal, the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled that "a court should engage in a two
step process: first, the court should determine whether the defensive
steps were 'coercive or preclusive'; second, if the defensive steps were
not 'coercive or preclusive,' then the court should determine whether
1 75
the defensive conduct falls within a 'range of reasonableness.
Under Unitrin, a defensive measure taken in response to a
perceived threat is reasonable and proportionate when it is "noncoercive" and "non-preclusive."'176 A preclusive defense is one that
prevents any future change-of-control transaction, 177 whereas a
coercive defense is one that forces shareholders to agree with
management. 178 Reasonable and proportionate defenses are deemed
to satisfy the presumption of the business judgment rule; therefore,
the court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the
[board's] decision can be 'attributed to any rational business
purpose."'179 If, however, the court determines that the defense is
''coercive" or "preclusive," then the burden of proof shifts from the
party challenging the board's decision to the board, who must then

171.
Id.
172.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
173.
See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
174.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 846.
175.
Id. (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88, 1387 n.38).
176.
Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338. These are terms of art "evoking fair
disclosure, timing, [and] process." Id.
177.
See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387 ("[T]his Court concluded that the Time
board's defensive response was reasonable and proportionate .. .because it did not
preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company,
i.e., was not preclusive." (citing Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1990))).
178.
See id. ("[Tlhis Court concluded that the Time board's defensive response
was reasonable and proportionate since it was not aimed at 'cramming down' on its
shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, i.e., was not coercive .... (citing
Time, 571 A.2d at 1154-55)).
179.
Id. at 1373 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985) (alteration in original).
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show that its action had a "rational business purpose."18 0 If the board
meets its burden, then the board is entitled to the traditional
business judgment rule81 ' and "the burden shifts back to the
plaintiffs who have the ultimate burden of persuasion to show a
breach of the directors' fiduciary duties." 182
Additional analysis is required when a third-party bid occurs.
Friendly merger agreements often give rise to unsolicited bids.1 8 3 In
this situation, the third-party bid represents "a threatened change of
control," and, thus, "a target's directors' actions with respect to that
bid, including any changes to the original merger agreement, will be
governed by the enhanced scrutiny of the Unocal standard.' 18 4 Since
a change of control question has been raised, should Revlon duties
apply? The Delaware Supreme Court answered this question in the
negative in Time: "[S]o long as the initial merger agreement does not
itself involve a change-of-control transaction, the appearance of an
unsolicited bid (whether cash or stock) does not in and of itself impose
Revlon duties on the target [company]."'1 85 The court further noted
that the determination of a threat is not for the court to make; the
186
decision is reserved for the board of directors.
Under the third standard of review, entire fairness, the court will
determine whether a transaction is entirely fair, both in terms of
price and process, to the shareholders. 1 87 Entire fairness applies
when the presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, such
as when an actual conflict of interest among a majority of directors
exists.18 8 This standard is the most exacting of the standards of
review: 189 the board must show it acted with both "fair dealing" and
"fair price."'190 Upon satisfying this burden, the burden of proving the
unfairness of the transaction shifts back to the plaintiffs. 191 If the

See id. at 1374 (citing Joseph Hinsey, IV, Business Judgment and the
180.
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the
Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 609, 611-13 (1984)).
181.
See id. at 1390.
182.
Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (1985) (citing Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)).
183.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 852.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. (summarizing the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Time)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 852-53 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 332 (Del.
186.

Ch. 2000)).
Id. at 840.
187.
188.
Id. (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 701 (Del. 1983)).
189.
Id. (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701).
190.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
191.
See Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 842; cf. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130
(Del. Ch. 2006) (reasoning that burden did not shift back to Plaintiff when Defendants
failed to satisfy their burden of entire fairness).
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plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden, the court will apply the
192
deferential business judgment rule.
2.

Delaware Takeover Defenses

Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law outlines
the powers of the directors and officers of a corporation, including the
implicit authority to utilize takeover defenses if in the best interest of
the company and its shareholders. 1 93 Specifically, "the business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.' 1 94 The specific powers of a Delaware corporation are
enumerated in section 122. In particular, section 122(4) provides that
every corporation shall have the power to "[p]urchase, receive .. .or
otherwise acquire, own, hold ... use and otherwise deal in and with
real or personal property . ..and to sell, convey, lease, exchange,
transfer or otherwise dispose of .. .all or any of its property and
assets."'195 However, shareholders do get to vote upon a sale, lease,
or exchange of "all or substantially all of [the corporation's] property
and assets.

' 196

Moreover, the American Jurisprudence on Corporations provides
substance to takeover defenses, including crown jewels. 197 A crown
jewel is defined as "the main attraction of the target company,"'198 and
this piece de rdsistance may be used in a defensive maneuver to "ward
off the raider."'199 A crown jewel defense is "[t]he sale of an asset,
which has the result of making a company less attractive to a tender
200
offeror."
Delaware takeover jurisprudence, as compared to Dutch law, is
much clearer and more predictable. Clarity and predictability are
desired outcomes within the law, especially in an increasingly global
economy. International parties to a cross-border deal must be able to
research and rely on the laws of each other's jurisdiction in order to
lower transactions costs and encourage cross-border deals. Therefore,
the gap of clarity in Dutch takeover law must be filled. Delaware

192.
See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)
(quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)). The
business judgment rule is the default standard of review if the plaintiff cannot carry
his burden. See id.
193.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2008).
194.
Id. § 141(a).
195.
Id. § 122(4).
196.
Id. § 271(a) (emphasis added).
197.
See 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2230 (2008).
198.
Id. § 2176.
199.
Id.
200.
Id. § 2230.
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takeover law provides an excellent model, as examined in the
following sections.

III. ANALYSIS: COMPATIBILITY OF DUTCH AND DELAWARE
TAKEOVER LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

"Historically,
hostile
takeovers
were
rare
in
the
Netherlands .... ,,201 In recent years, however, "the number of hostile
bids has increased," and the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam
Court of Appeals has played a key role 20 2 in applying Dutch written
law (Dutch Civil Code and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code)
and creating some of its own. 203 Proponents of takeover defenses note
that although the use of such devices has been criticized recently, the
defenses have consistently been upheld in Dutch courts.20 4 "The
Enterprise Chamber has begun to provide a judicial framework for
takeovers in the Netherlands, especially with respect to the use of
'20 5
anti-takeover devices.
One unique aspect of the Netherlands as compared to the rest of
the EU is that it is one of the only countries whose courts have played
a significant role in many cross-border European takeover
situations. 20 6 However, because there is currently no uniform code on
takeovers in the EU, the courts have an opportunity to actively
participate in interpreting the law of different European
jurisdictions.20 7 This presents a huge opportunity for the Dutch
Enterprise Chamber to take the lead among EU jurisdictions to
become the EU's special business court, analogous to the Delaware
20 8
Chancery Court in the United States.
Increasingly, the emerging Dutch judicial framework appears to
mirror Delaware's common law doctrines on takeovers.
This

201.
Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 852.
202. Id.
203.
Maarten J. Kroeze, The Dutch Companies and Business Court as a
Specialized Court 8 (Rotterdam Institute of Private Law, Working Paper No. 976277,

2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=976277.
204.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 747.
205.
Id. at 853.
206.
See id. at 750; cf. Huub Willems, Other Aspects of the Companies and
Business Court's Powers, in THE COMPANIES AND BUSINESS COURT FROM A
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 193, 199 (Marius Josephus Jitta et al. eds., 2004)
(explaining that many of the cases in the court involve non-Dutch parties).
207.
See Willems, supra note 206, at 199-200.
208.
Lambert, supra note 4, at 176 (comparing Delaware Chancery Court to
Dutch Enterprise Chamber and stating that the "Chancery division ...
could be
deemed to be the most similar entity in the United States with specialized business
expertise"); Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338 (stating that Delaware "remains the
leading state of incorporation and leading source of corporate state law" in the United
States).
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development is interesting for a number of reasons, including the fact
that the Netherlands is a civil law country; whereas the United
States is a common law country. In general, civil law countries follow
the written law (i.e., the Codes) and do not put much weight on the
unwritten law (i.e., judicial precedent). 20 9 The Dutch Enterprise
Chamber, however, is more progressive and essentially has the same
legal powers and discretion as its common law brother, the Delaware
Chancery Court. 210 In particular, Justice Huub Willems, President of
the Enterprise Chamber, believes that both jurisdictions have
principle-based substantive law.2 11 Justice Willems is "convinced
that in the Netherlands developments [in business law] will proceed
similarly [as in Delaware] .,212
The Supreme Court's main issue with the Enterprise Chamber's
decision, and its justification for reversal, fits squarely within the
civil law model-the Enterprise Chamber's decision is not supported
by Dutch written law. 213 Yet, the Supreme Court clearly could have
affirmed the Enterprise Court by relying on an established judicial
framework, as it has done numerous times before, if it had agreed
with the lower court. 214 Instead, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court, implying that there was an additional, underlying factor
weighing on the high court's decision. 215 It seems most likely that the
Supreme Court simply disagreed with the Enterprise Chamber over
the application of a Delaware-like judicial framework, but not the
Delaware law itself. Commentators such as Anne van Nood, a Dutch
lawyer, take this a step further by contending that the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected a Delaware-like framework because of the
differing views on corporate governance in the United States and the
Netherlands. 2 16 The Netherlands prefers anti-takeover devices that

209.
note 19.
210.
211.

See generally EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra
See Willems, supra note 206, at 197-98.
Huub Willems, The Companies and Business Court: Some Introductory

Remarks, in

THE COMPANIES AND BUSINESS COURT FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW

PERSPECTIVE, supra note 206, at 181, 191.
212.
See Willems, supranote 206, at 198.
213.
See ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,
4.4. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]here is not enough support for any
other opinion in the law and the generally accepted legal conviction as expressed, inter
alia, in the Dutch corporate governance code." Id. (citing TABAKSBLAT CODE [TC]
(Neth.), availableat http://corpgov.nllpage/downloads/CODE%20DEF/2OENGELS%20
COMPLEET%201II.pdf).
214.
Cf. Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 852-53 (arguing that the Enterprise
Chamber has provided "a judicial framework for takeover battles," such as those
involving Gucci and Rodamco).
215.
ABN AMRO ShareholderLitigation, Supreme Court, supranote 23, 6.
216.
See generally Anne van Nood, The ABN AMRO Ruling: Some
Commentaries,2. Commentary from a Dutch Lawyer's Perspective, 4 EUR. COMPANY L.
168, 173 (2007).
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protect all the stakeholders. 2 17 Particularly, van Nood criticizes the

Enterprise Chamber's ruling as "aim[ed] at a more Anglo-Saxon
interpretation of the boards of directors being profit maximization for
'2 18
the shareholders.
Ultimately, the Dutch Supreme Court sided with critics such as
van Nood and overruled the Enterprise Chamber. 219 However, the
emerging Dutch judicial framework may have a very beneficial
impact on the Netherlands. Many of the large, prominent crossborder hostile takeover battles of the past few years have occurred in
the Netherlands. 220 The country's acceptance of hostile takeovers is
important because many other EU Member States remain culturally
and politically averse to cross-border hostile takeovers, often heavily
influencing the outcome of the bids and preventing the emergence of
2
a market for corporate control. 21
As long as the Netherlands remains open to hostile bids, many
corporate entities will gravitate to the country and relocate there
through incorporation or reincorporation, thus increasing the number
of cross-border deals. 22 2

To take advantage of this situation, the

Netherlands first needs to increase legal certainty by solidifying its
takeover framework in a vein similar to Delaware's takeover laws.
The Netherlands should not, however, simply adopt the Delaware
doctrines wholesale; instead, the Dutch must tailor their takeover law
by expanding Delaware's shareholder rights view to the more
expansive, European-friendly stakeholder-centered view. The Dutch
Enterprise Chamber has the opportunity to become the European
Union's Delaware. Not only will increased legal certainty encourage
international deals but it will also increase domestic deals within the
Netherlands, similar to the Chancery Court's effect in Delaware.
A. JudicialDecisions:Dutch Supreme Court Leaves Opening
Amid Apparent Rejection of Enterprise Chamber's
Introduction of Delaware Trilogy
Although recent Dutch Enterprise Chamber decisions have
received praise both for their specific outcomes and for their
evolutionary role in building a Dutch judicial framework, its ruling
against the ABN AMRO Board in favor of shareholders was not as
well received. 223 There are three reasons for the Dutch Supreme
Court's reversal in the ABN AMRO case, each distinct from a

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 853.
van Nood, supra note 216, at 173.
ABNAMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 5.1.
Simpson et al., supranote 19, at 731.
Id.
See generally Bratton et al., supranote 24.
van Nood, supra note 216, at 171; Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 853.
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wholesale rejection of a Delaware-like framework. First, certainty
and reliability in commerce are very valuable commodities, and when
ignored, trust in the law is lost. Second, the Enterprise Chamber
appears to clearly overstep Parliament by expanding shareholder
rights beyond the legislature's intent. And finally, the ABN AMRO
facts were a poor base upon which to introduce Delaware-like laws
into the Netherlands. Instead of adopting the Delaware trilogy amid
poor facts, the Supreme Court left an opening for future adoption.
1.

Underlying Policy: Promote Certainty and Reliability within
Dutch Law

By overruling the Enterprise Chamber, the Dutch Supreme
224
Court "restored the trust in the Dutch Company Law system.
Achieving legal certainty is a key theme throughout the Supreme
Court's opinion. 22 5 The Dutch legislature made clear its policy of
legal certainty when it enacted Article 2:107(a) of the Dutch Civil
Code. 226 Article 2:107(a) states that "absence of approval by the
general meeting [of shareholders] . . . shall not affect the
representative authority of the management or the directors. '227 Not
only did the Enterprise Chamber ignore this directive, but it even
relied, in part, on this very same provision to grant the requested
injunctive relief to the ABN AMRO shareholders. 228 The Supreme
Court corrected this contradiction by upholding the legislature's
explicit intent.2 2 9 To prevent Bank of America, a third party, from
fulfilling its contract would appear to "ignore the legislator's choice of
'23 0
third party protection for contracting parties.
Pacta sunt servanda is an integral legal principle for building
trust within a legal system. 231 It offers certainty to parties not
familiar with local laws 23 2 and encourages businesses to choose one
legal system over another. 233 International third parties such as
Bank of America are precisely those entities the Dutch legislature
hoped to protect when it declined to adopt a rule requiring prior
shareholder approval. 23 4 Prior to the Netherlands' implementation of

224.

Oostwouder, supra note 20.

225.

ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 1 4.4,

4.7-8, 4.10.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233
234.
4.4.

Oostwouder, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
ABNAMRO ShareholderLitigation,Supreme Court, supra note 23, 1 5.1.
Oostwouder, supra note 20.
Id. at 211; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 117.
ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation,Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.8.
See id. 4.4; see also Oostwouder, supra note 20.
See ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,
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the EU Takeover Directive in late May 2007, Dutch law was unclear
as to when prior shareholder approval was required with regard to a
"transaction that [fell] within the authority of the managing board,
based on the mere circumstance that it involves the interest of the
shareholders in being able to sell their shares for the highest price
possible. '23 5 The Dutch legislature's decision not to mandate
shareholder rights of approval, but to allow companies the option of
providing shareholders these rights 23 6 is indicative of the legislature's
intent of enabling third parties to rely on ex ante legal opinions and
research performed prior to entering into a contract under Dutch
laws. 23 7 Additionally, the legislature limited the mandatory right of
approval to "a board resolution . . . so drastic that it will change the

identity or the character of the company or enterprise and the nature
of the shareholdership" in a clear attempt to increase legal
certainty.2 38
Anything less would provide "unacceptable legal
'239
uncertainty.
2.

Unprecedented Expansion of Shareholder Rights

Legal certainty also underlies the Supreme Court's analysis of
whether a right of prior approval of the general meeting of
shareholders for the sale of an asset is supported by Dutch law.2 40 In

addition to the legislative intent undertones, the Court notes that
requiring prior approval by the shareholders for a transaction that
falls squarely within the board's authority will exponentially increase
legal uncertainty, because it would include such inevitable
complications such as differing opinions, coordinating the general
shareholder's meeting, and determining the consequences if the board
241
failed to fulfill its obligation.

235.
Id.; see also van Nood, supra note 216, at 173. See generally supra Part II
(discussing the EU Takeover Directive).
236.
ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,
4.6
(citing BW § 2:359b (Neth.) (codifying the Dutch Parliament's implementation of the
EU Takeover Directive)).
237.

For example, third parties must be able to rely on the transactions
performed by the managing board of a company in accordance with the
provisions of the [Dutch] law and the [company's] articles of association
being inviolable and to the extent they may be violated, that this
possibility exists only on the basis of legal grounds with which third
parties could have been familiar from the law or the articles of
association.

See id. 4.4 (emphasis added).
238.
Id. 4.7.
239.

Id.

240.
241.

See Oostwouder, supra note 20.
ABN AMRO Shareholder Litigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23,

4.4.

4.4.
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Additionally, a broader corporate governance tension underlies
the Supreme Court's reversal. The Dutch Corporate Governance
Code is based on the principle that a company is "a long-term form of
The
collaboration between the various parties involved. '242
Enterprise Chamber's obligation that a board focus solely on
maximizing shareholder value "seem[ed] to be contrary to the
fundamental principle of Dutch company law that the board of
directors of a company must take into account the interests of all
stakeholders of that company, including but not limited to the
shareholders. 2 43 The Chamber's interpretation of the board's duties
not only conflicted with a general Dutch principle and the Corporate
Governance Code, but it also contradicted current Dutch regulations
244
protecting all stakeholder interests.
Prior to the Supreme Court's reversal, the Dutch legal
community was also concerned with whether the Enterprise Chamber
had changed the established Dutch principle "that the board of
directors of a company must weigh the interests of all the
stakeholders involved. '245 This approach appears to be very similar
246
to Delaware's with regard to takeovers and the duties of the board.
However, the difference between Dutch law and Delaware law with
respect to the ownership structure of a company poses a significant
problem. The American view of corporate governance is shareholdercentered, whereas the Dutch view is stakeholder-centered. 247 This
difference may result in different duties imposed on the board. An
American board can be more focused, only looking out for the needs of
its shareholders, 248 but a Dutch board must look beyond shareholders
to its other stakeholders as well. 249 Therefore, perhaps the Supreme
Court was unwilling to extend shareholders' rights to the detriment
of other stakeholders.
A final example of the legal certainty rationale within the
context of extending shareholders' rights can be found in the Supreme
Court's refusal to analyze the sale of LaSalle under Dutch takeover
defense doctrines. 250 Interestingly, in light of facts that appear to

242.
TABAKSBLAT CODE [TC] pmbl. 3 (Neth.), available at http://corpgov.nllpage/
downloads/CODE%20DEF%20ENGELS%20COMPLEET%2011I.pdf.
243.
van Nood, supra note 216, at 172-73.
244.
See id. at 173. For example, the current regulation on public offers provides
safeguards for stakeholder interests, specifically requiring the offer document to
include a statement on how the rights of employees will be protected in a merger. Id.
Oostwouder, supra note 20; see also van Nood, supranote 216, at 172-73.
245.
See Oostwouder, supra note 20.
246.
247.
EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 19, at 32.
248.
See id.
249.
See id.
250.
Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 211-12.
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signify a crown jewel defense, 25 ' the Supreme Court explicitly found
that the sale of LaSalle did not involve a "co-ordinated manoeuvre
'252
aimed at frustrating the takeover intentions of the Consortium.
Rather than characterize the sale of LaSalle as a takeover defense,
the Supreme Court termed it "a 'wonderful opportunity.' ' 253 At first,
this appears to be an absurd characterization, especially in light of
2 54
the Dutch Court's recent acceptance of takeover defenses.
However, upon examination of Dutch takeover defenses, it becomes
apparent how the court furthered legal certainty by avoiding a
contradictory analysis.
Under Dutch law, a valid takeover defense should have a
255
temporary nature, be proportional to the threat, and be reversible.
The sale of LaSalle likely would fail the takeover defense requirement
because it was permanent (RBS could not later buy LaSalle from
ABM AMRO) and it was irreversible (ABN AMRO could not get
LaSalle back from Bank of America). In light of the ABN AMRO
Board's express warranty that prior shareholder approval was not
required, the consequence of holding the crown jewel defense invalid
would be to block Bank of America's third party interest in
performing the contract. Clearly, this would result in "unacceptable
2 56
legal uncertainty."
3.

ABN AMRO Poor Facts: Nothing for Revlon- or Unocal-duties To
Attach To

Although the Enterprise Chamber's attempt to adopt a
Delaware-like framework was commendable, the Chamber may have
avoided the Supreme Court's rejection if it had presented its
arguments in a more persuasive way. The Chamber's ultimate
analytical error appears to be that it choose poor facts and a recently
clarified area of Dutch law to introduce a novel framework. Instead
of adopting a Delaware-like framework, the Chamber's statement
that "by displaying the bank for sale, the board of directors and the
supervisory board of ABN AMRO Holding have committed
themselves to create those circumstances for the sale process that are

251.
See de Groot, supra note 51; Lambert, supra note 4; Dash, supra note 7;
ABNAMRO ShareholdersVow to Sue, supranote 10.
252. ABNAMRO ShareholderLitigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.2.
253. Id.
254. Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 746-47 (noting that Dutch courts have
accepted takeover defenses upon a company's "good faith argument that the takeover
threat was against the best interest of the target and all its constituents...").
255. Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 212 (citing RNA, Hoge Raad der Nederland
[HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 april 2000, NJ 2003 (286, m.n.t. Ma.)
(Neth.)).
256. ABNAMRO ShareholderLitigation, Supreme Court, supra note 23, 4.4.
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most favorable for its shareholders '257 evoked the heaviest criticism
by those outside of the Judiciary. 25 8 The critique among lawyers such
as van Nood conflated the adoption of a Delaware law with the
possibility that the Chamber attempted to move the Netherlands
away from a stakeholder view and towards a shareholder view of the
25 9
company to the detriment of the stakeholders.
Additionally, the outcome of the ABN AMRO case would most
likely be the same under Delaware law as under Dutch law. It is also
worth noting that few, if any, of the problems that the Dutch courts
encountered are present under a Delaware-like regime. First, legal
certainty is attainable within the Delaware-framework. Second, the
difference in company structures-shareholder versus stakeholderis not preclusive of Delaware law's applicability in Dutch law.
Delaware's takeover framework adequately addresses shareholders'
rights by imposing a heightened duty on the board to maximize
shareholder interests. 260
The same result is achievable in the
Netherlands through the establishment of analogous fiduciary duties;
a further remedy is not needed. Third, the Delaware takeover
defense analysis is less restrictive than the Dutch law; thus, the sale
of LaSalle would probably be upheld as a takeover defense under
Unocal-the defense must be reasonable and proportional to
threat 261-and
Unitrin-the defense must not be coercive or
2 62
preclusive.
Although at least one commentator believes the Supreme Court
rejected any future Revlon-like duty or adoption of a Delaware
framework, 263 the Supreme Court probably left an opening for a
Revlon-like doctrine.2 64 It is more likely that the Supreme Court
overruled the Enterprise Chamber because it saw what the Chamber
missed-a Revlon-like doctrine was not applicable to the ABN AMRO
facts due to Time-and, thus, was not ready to embrace Revlon on
bad facts. When the facts are ripe, a Revlon-Unocal-Unitrin-like
trilogy should be introduced to the Netherlands.
B. Analysis of ABNAMRO Case Under Delaware Law
Although the very bases underlying Delaware and Dutch
corporate law appear to be different, it is significant that the outcome

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Oostwouder, supra note 214, at 172.
See generally van Nood, supranote 216; Oostwouder, supranote 20.
See van Nood, supranote 216, at 173.
See supra Part II.C.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995).
See Oostwouder, supranote 20, at 214.
See supra Part III.A.
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of the ABN AMIRO case would have been the same under Delaware
26 5
law.
Under Delaware law, Revlon duties are triggered by a sale of
control transaction as defined in QVC, and arise "when a majority of
a corporation's voting shares are acquired by a single person or
entity, or by a cohesive group acting together. ' 266 The essential
question dividing the line between Revlon analysis and Unocal
analysis is whether a sale of control occurs. 267 The Unocal analysis
consists of a two-pronged test.2 68 First, did the directors have
reasonable grounds for believing a threat to corporate policy
existed? 26 9 Second, was the defensive measure chosen proportional to
270
the threat?
Although the Dutch Enterprise Chamber found that ABN AMRO
was for sale, 271 a Delaware court would most likely conclude the
opposite under Time. 272
The Revlon analysis is sufficient for
situations where the target becomes "in play" as a result of either an
initial unsolicited hostile bid or an initial friendly bid. 273 The
analysis becomes complicated, however, when the initial bid is a
friendly agreement and an unsolicited hostile bid attempts to
interfere. 274 This scenario raises the issue of when the change of
control question should be asked. The Delaware Supreme Court
answered this question in Time: "As long as the initial merger
agreement [ABN AMRO-Barclays] does not itself involve a change-ofcontrol transaction, the appearance of an unsolicited bid [RBS
Consortium] ... does not in and of itself impose Revlon duties on the
target [ABN AMRO] .... ",275 To determine if a change-of-control
transaction occurs, the relevant comparison is between the control of

265.
M & A Law Prof Blog, ABN Amro Wins One, http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/mergers/2007/07/abn-amro-wins-o.html (July 13, 2007).
266.
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173
(Del. 1986); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del.
1994).
267.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 842.
268.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
271.
van Nood, supra note 216, at 172.
272.
Vlahakis, supra note 5, at 852.
273.
Id.
274.
Id.
275.
Id. In Time, the Delaware Chancery Court reasoned that no change-ofcontrol transaction occurred because, both before and after the Time-Warner merger,
control of Time "existed in a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders representing
a voting majority - in other words, in the market." Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990). It is worth noting that although the Delaware
Supreme Court initially dismissed the Chancellor's reasoning, and affirmed Time on
other grounds, the Delaware Supreme Court later adopted the Chancellor's reasoning
from Time in QVC. Id.; Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
43 (Del. 1994) (citing Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (Del. 1990)).
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target before and after the merger. 276
No change-of-control
transaction occurs if, both before and after the merger, control of the
company "exist[s] in a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders"
2 77
(i.e., the market).
Although at first blush the threshold test appears to be Revlon,
the ABN AMRO case must first be analyzed under Time. The initial
merger agreement between ABN AMRO and Barclays does not
involve a change-of-control transaction because control of both
companies before the merger is widely diffused in the market, and the
control of the merged company after the transaction is still within the
market.27 8 Since no sale of control would occur, Revlon duties do not
apply. Therefore, the next step of the analysis is Unocal.
The ABN AMRO Board easily meets the Unocal test. As
illustrated in Time, the decision regarding corporate strategy and
culture lies almost exclusively with the board of directors; thus the
board can easily meet its burden to prove that the RBS bid was a
threat to ABN AMRO. Moreover, the ABN AMRO Board sold only
one division of its numerous subsidiaries. 279 Although LaSalle was
arguably one of ABN AMRO's most valuable assets, its sale was not
"coercive or preclusive" of a future change-of-control transaction. 28 0
Thus, the board would easily meet the second Unocal prong.
Once out of the case law analysis, the Delaware court would turn
to state statutes to confirm that no other requirement prevented
application of the business judgment rule. The applicable Delaware
General Corporation Law sections are 141(a) and 122.281 When read
together, these statutes empower the board of directors to sell assets
of the corporation, except as otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation. 28 2 Delaware statutory law does not require prior
approval of the shareholders unless the sale constitutes "all or
substantially all of ABN AMRO's assets. '283 Thus, under Delaware
law, ABN AMRO would not be required to obtain approval of the
shareholders for the sale of LaSalle to Bank of America.

276.
See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46 (citing Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (1990) (reaffirming
the Court of Chancery's well-reasoned decision)).
277.
Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
278.
Barclays does not have any control shareholders; control is widely diffused
within the market.
279.
ABN AMRO HOLDING N.V., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 215-17 (2007), available
at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABN/407215467x0x183491/3cclela6-32474e01-ba33-lffba9d4lfe9/ar2007en.pdf.
280.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). In
hindsight, the sale of LaSalle to Bank of America was clearly not coercive or preclusive
because the ultimate winner of ABN AMRO was the RBS Consortium-not Barclays!
281.
See supra Part II.C.2.
282.
See supra Part II.C.2.
283.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2008); M & A Law Prof Blog, supra note
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The Enterprise Chamber attempted to apply Revlon directly.
However, under Delaware jurisprudence, this was incorrect. Either
the Enterprise Chamber misunderstood the Revlon/Unocal analysis,
or the Enterprise Chamber was not actually trying to apply Delaware
law in the Netherlands. Although either analysis is plausible, it is
more likely that the Enterprise Chamber was attempting to apply
Delaware law.
The great prominence of, and respect for, the
Delaware Chancery Court, coupled with numerous commentaries and
Justice Willem's reverence for Delaware law, suggests this was the
case. 28 4 Unfortunately, its adoption failed due to poor facts and a
misunderstanding of the intricacies of the Revlon- Unocal-Unitrin
trilogy.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: DUTCH JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF TAILORED

DELAWARE TAKEOVER TRILOGY '
The Dutch Enterprise Chamber picked a worthy model for its
judicial framework when it chose Delaware. Most nations regard
28 5
Delaware as the leading U.S. jurisdiction for business law.
Although the Enterprise Chamber incorrectly applied Delaware
takeover law to the facts of ABN AMRO by overlooking the Time
analysis and by over-extending shareholders' rights, its reliance on
Delaware law was well-founded and appropriately timed. Due to the
current EU landscape, now is an excellent time for the adoption of
Delaware takeover law. Not only will Delaware's takeover trilogy
provide certainty and predictability to the Dutch business court
system, but it will also solidify the Netherlands' reputation as a
competitive business-friendly jurisdiction within the European
Union. 28 6 This adoption could enable the Netherlands to position
28 7
itself to become Europe's Delaware.

284.
See generally Willems, supra note 206.
285.
See Karolina Carlsson, A Possible European Delaware: Can the European
Private Company Prevent It? 13 (May 2006) (unpublished Master's thesis, Jonkoping
University) (on file with author) (stating that "Delaware does dominate the U.S.
market for charters, with more than half of the larger enterprises incorporated in their
system").
286.
Bratton et al., supranote 24, at 7; see also Doughtery, supra note 21.
287.
See Didier Martin & Forrest Alogna, New Delaware, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec.
20, 2007 [hereinafter New Delaware];see also Carlsson, supra note 285, at 12 (defining
the European Delaware concept as "[the] one Member State comes to have the same
advantage and leading status in the market as Delaware has in the U.S.").
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A. Characteristicsof Delaware'sSuccess
Commentators attribute Delaware's domination of the U.S.
corporate law market to three key characteristics. 288 First,
Delaware's state laws are company-friendly. Due to Delaware's small
size and dependence on corporate tax revenues, it had to draft
attractive laws to keep firms within the state.2 8 9 Second, Delaware's
290
judiciary is extremely competent, knowledgeable, and specialized.
Not only does the Court have extensive business expertise, but it also
is one of the most efficient courts within the U.S. 291 Finally,
Delaware is persistent.
Throughout the years, Delaware has
experimented with company-friendly laws until it solidified its
position as the U.S. leader. 292 Although it has cornered the market,
Delaware must remain up-to-date to maintain its position.
Delaware's key characteristics provide a useful model for the
Netherlands to use to enhance its appeal to European businesses.
B. The Current EU Landscape
The idea that cross-border competition can benefit a Member
State is relatively new to the European Union.2 93 Founded upon
treaties which promote a "non-competition" strategy, the European
Union's goal has always been to maintain virtual national monopolies
on corporate lawmaking.2 94 As a result, competition among the
Member States remained unattainable until recently. For example,
the adoption of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, along with
recent European Court of Justice rulings, allow corporations to merge
and restructure or to relocate their principal place of business "based
on the legal rules they prefer. '295 It is too early, however, "to

288.
Carlsson, supra note 285, at 13.
289.
Id. (citing Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate
Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987)).
290.
Carlsson, supra note 285, at 14.
291.
Id. (citing Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed
Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy
15-16 (Oct. 18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
292.
Id. (citing Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition 2 (Harvard Law School,
Discussion Paper No. 432, 2003)).
293.
See Kroeze, supra note 203, at 1 ('The idea that the competitiveness of
Europe as a whole is not enhanced by harmonizing all company law rules, but by
harmonizing some key rules and by stimulating flexibility and facilitating cross-border
entrepreneurial activities has gained ground."). See generally Philippe Peill,
Companies Crossing Borders Within Europe, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 6, 6 (2008); Bratton et
al., supra note 24.
294.
Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 8. Interestingly, a hidden objective of the
Union's formation may have been to prevent the Netherlands from becoming a
"European Delaware" in the late 1950s. Kroeze, supra note 203, at 1.
295.
Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 5.
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conclude.., whether the Directive and the [ECJ cases] will lead to an
increase in the reincorporation mobility and eventually more
regulatory competition in Europe. '29 6
Nonetheless, the recent
evolution of corporate mobility and corporate law points toward a
'29 7
potential "emergence of a Delaware-like 'European' State.
The time is ripe for the Enterprise Court to enhance the
Netherlands' attractiveness as a company-friendly jurisdiction.
Recently, the Enterprise Chamber has seen an increase in takeover
cases, 298 and it is unlikely that the legislature will be able to keep
pace.2 99 Indeed, in a 2004 presentation to Parliament, the Dutch
Minister of Justice pointed to the Enterprise Chamber as a vehicle
through which Dutch company law could be modernized.3 00 It is
logical, then, for the court to turn toward its own devices, even in a
civil law country such as the Netherlands.30 1 The Dutch have been
very forward-looking and receptive of hostile bids-much more than
its European counterparts.30 2 As a result, companies may begin
303
migrating to more attractive jurisdictions such as the Netherlands.
C. Dutch JudicialAdoption of Delaware Takeover Trilogy
Adoption of Delaware's takeover law may solidify the
Netherlands' strong position in the competitive regulatory landscape
of the European Union. Indeed, the Netherlands must act to counter
recent criticism for showing "little or no sign of high-quality
legislative or case law reform. 30°4 Currently, most academics believe
the UK has taken the lead in the race to become the "European
3 05
Delaware," although the Netherlands is not far behind.
The ABN AMRO decision provides the Netherlands with an
opportunity to mirror two of Delaware's characteristics, thus

296.
Id.
297.
Id. at 6.
298.
Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 745.
299.
See id.
300.
Kroeze, supra note 203, at 16 (stating that the existence of the specialized
business court (the Enterprise Chamber) may attract business to the Netherlands).
301.
Id. The Enterprise Chamber actually has a good deal of discretion, in
contrast to the U.S. where the plaintiff must first ask for a measure before the court
will consider it. Id. at 14 (stating that the Enterprise Chamber "has discretionary
powers to take the provisional measures that it deems necessary, even when the
parties did not request certain measures").
302.
See Simpson et al., supra note 19, at 745-46 (noting increased Dutch
activity in takeovers).
303.
See generally PeHl6, supra note 293; Bratton et al., supra note 24; Carlsson,
supra note 285. Generally, there are two types of corporate mobility: incorporation and
re-incorporation.
304.
Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 7.
305.
John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus
Regulatory Competition 12 (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working
Paper No. 307, 2005); New Delaware, supra note 287.
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improving its competitive position within the European Union. The
adoption of Delaware takeover law would promote company-friendly
Dutch laws and will improve the efficiency and predictability of the
Enterprise Chamber, thereby enhancing the Netherlands' appeal to
businesses.
However, due to differences in the legal systems, implementation
of the Delaware framework poses a few issues. Importantly, the
framework must be tailored for the Netherlands. The Dutch must
expand Delaware's notion of a shareholder to include all stakeholders
to keep it aligned with longstanding principles of duties toward all
stakeholders. 30 6 A line must be drawn, however, to delineate the
appropriate level of stakeholder rights. 30 7 Fortunately, the Dutch
Enterprise Chamber has discretionary power to take provisional
measures sua sponte; thus, the Court may implement the Delaware
adoption.30 8 Justice Huub Willems, President of the Enterprise
Chamber, believes the answer to incorporating comparative law into
30 9
the Netherlands to be a 'law-harmonizing interpretation method,"
such as the one presented here.
1.

Benefits

The Netherlands will benefit from adopting Delaware's takeover
law by attracting businesses in four distinct ways. First, it will
attract businesses throughout Europe by establishing legal
certainty. 310
For instance, Bank of America, a third party to the
ABN AMRO deal, could have saved court costs and time if the Dutch
law it had researched and relied upon ex ante had been upheld.
Second, an increase in deals flowing into the Netherlands may lead to

306.
EU COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 19, at 28.
307.
Very interesting questions arise regarding the correct level of shareholders'
rights. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for IncreasingShareholderPower, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005), and Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?:
Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997
(1994), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 618 (2006), and Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 187 (1991). This is the "shareholder empowerment debate." This Note does not
explore this issue, but at some point the Dutch judiciary should examine the
appropriate level of shareholder protection. Professors Bebchuk and Bainbridge
intensely debate what the correct level is.
308.
Kroeze, supra note 203, at 14. "Sua sponte" is a Latin term that means the
court may examine a question of law even if the parties have not raised it. It is rare for
a civil law system to have this discretion. See also Willems, supranote 206, at 198-99.
309.
Willems, supra note 206, at 199-200.
310.
See Carlsson, supra note 285, at 13 (citing Roberta Romano, The State
CompetitionDebate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987)); see also Kroeze,
supra note 203, at 8-9 (listing contributions that Enterprise Court may make, or has
made, to Dutch company law).
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increased revenues for the state.3 1 1 Third, the Netherlands will
benefit by enhancing its specialized business court.3 12 Finally, a
fourth benefit is an improved corporate governance code.3 13 Often,
the market for corporate control is seen as a way to align
management's incentives with those of shareholders. 314 Attracting
new entities to the Netherlands will also result in the additional
benefits of job creation3 15 and increased quality of professional
3 16
services located within the country.
2.

Potential Drawbacks

Assuming that the Netherlands adopts the Delaware takeover
trilogy, there is no guarantee that it will experience the same benefits
as Delaware. Commentators currently disagree as to whether the
required incentives for a "European Delaware" exist.3 17 Nonetheless,

it is too soon to know the outcome of the emerging inter-European
318
competition or who will prevail as the European Delaware.

V. CONCLUSION

The Dutch Enterprise Chamber's instinct to strengthen the
Dutch business law in the takeover context was a prudent one. It
chose an excellent model in the Delaware Courts, as Delaware
corporate law is generally regarded as "the leading source of
corporate state law" in the United States. 319 Unfortunately, its
timing was misplaced and misjudged. ABN AMRO's facts were not
ideal for Delaware law because the same conclusion results under
either Dutch or Delaware law. Under the facts of ABN AMRO,

311.
See PellI, supra note 293, at 6 (one benefit of corporate mobility is economic
growth). But see Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 4 ('[C]harter fees and franchise taxes
are not available to incentivize European member states to modernize and optimize
their corporate law regimes.").
312.
See Carlsson, supra note 285, at 14 (citing Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 15-16 (Oct. 18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author)).
313.
Kroeze, supra note 203, at 2 ("[S]pecialized business courts ... make ...
important contributions to the development of corporate governance in their
jurisdictions.").
314.
See Brown et al., supra note 7, at 313.
315.
Pell, supra note 293, at 6.
316.
See Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 4.
317.
Compare New Delaware, supra note 287 (monetary incentives exist), with
Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 4 (charter and franchise taxes not available but
incentives to appease the professional services industry exist).
318.
See Bratton et al., supra note 24, at 7 ("It is too early to draw hasty
conclusions about the emergence of a European Delaware.").
319.
See Dougherty, supra note 21, at 338.
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Delaware's Time precedent dictates that Unocal, and not Revlon,
duties apply. Thus, the Dutch Supreme Court's ultimate result was
correct.
Notwithstanding this mistake, the Enterprise Chamber
should adopt a tailored version of the Delaware trilogy for the Dutch
system.
A judicial framework such as Delaware's provides certainty to
both the legal and business markets.
This certainty, in turn,
encourages confidence and trust in the company law. 3 20 Coupled with
the divergent, and often adverse, takeover laws throughout Europe,
the Netherlands has a chance to lead change towards a freer market
321
for corporate control and increased inter-European competition.
But the Netherlands first needs to prepare itself with an established
judicial framework. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber can take the
lead in the European Union and become Europe's Delaware. Not only
will the Netherlands benefit from increased certainty, but it will also
experience corollary benefits such as increased revenues and perhaps
a stronger corporate governance regime.
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320.
See Oostwouder, supra note 20, at 216.
321.
See generally Bratton et al., supra note 24; Carlsson, supra note 285.
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